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Abstract 
Reliance on self-rated health to proxy medical need can bias estimation of education-related inequity in health 
care utilisation. We correct this bias both by instrumenting self-rated health with objective health indicators 
and by purging self-rated health of reporting heterogeneity identified from health vignettes. Using data on 
elderly Europeans, we find that instrumenting self-rated health shifts the distribution of doctor visits in the 
direction of inequality favouring the better educated. There is a further, and typically larger, shift the same 
direction when correction is made for the tendency of the better educated to rate their health more negatively.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout most of Europe there is a stated policy aspiration to equitable provision of health care. This is often 
interpreted as the horizontal equity principle of equal treatment for equal need. In empirical work, the 
prevailing approach is to measure horizontal inequity by the degree to which utilisation is related to 
socioeconomic status (SES) after controlling for differences in needs (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2000a,b). 
Existing European evidence reveals a bias favouring those of low SES in the distribution of primary care but 
inequity to the advantage of higher socioeconomic groups in specialist care (Van Doorslaer et al, 2000; Van 
Doorslaer et al, 2004).  
 The validity of this evidence is contingent on the adequacy of the measures of need employed. As 
comprehensive, objective health measures are seldom available in the general population surveys that provide 
data on health care utilisation and SES, researchers must usually rely on self-reported categorical health 
indicators. It is, however, possible that two equally healthy individuals report different levels of health because 
their conceptions of good health and their health expectations are contingent on their knowledge of disease 
and available medical treatments, as well as the observed health of their peers. To use a much-cited example 
from India, self-reported morbidity rates are highest in Kerala, the state with the highest life expectancy, the 
highest rate of literacy and the most extensive public health services (Dreze and Sen, 2002; Sen, 2002). They are 
higher still in the US (Murray and Chen, 1992; Sen, 2002). If health perceptions also vary with socioeconomic 
status, then self-reported health will not provide an unbiased benchmark of needs against which to measure 
inequity in health care utilisation. Then, as argued by van Doorslaer et al (2004), evidence of higher rates of 
utilisation of General Practitioner (GP) services in Europe among those of lower SES may not be indicative of 
inequity favouring the poor but, rather, a tendency of more disadvantaged groups to under-report morbidity. 
This has long been recognised (e.g. O’Donnell and Propper, 1991) but, hitherto, it has been difficult to do much 
about it. It has been shown that inclusion of a larger battery of health indicators (e.g. Van Doorslaer et al, 2000) 
or allowance for unobserved individual heterogeneity (e.g. Bago d’Uva et al, 2009) ameliorates the problem. 
But with data on self-reports only, the fundamental problem remains that differences in reporting behaviour 
cannot be disentangled from differences in true health. 
Anchoring vignettes offer a potential solution to the problem. They identify reporting behaviour 
directly through survey respondents’ ratings of case vignettes that describe fixed levels of functioning within a 
given health domain (Tandon et al, 2003; King et al, 2004). Systematic differences in these ratings by socio-
demographic characteristics provide evidence of heterogeneity in reporting thresholds. Under assumptions, 
these differences in reporting styles can then be purged from the ratings of own health.  
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This study uses vignettes to identify differences in the reporting of health by education (and also by 
age, gender and country) and determines the impact of correcting for such differences on the measurement of 
education-related inequity in the utilisation of primary and specialist medical care. The focus on disparities by 
education is partly driven by the data used, which come from the Survey on Health, Aging and Retirement in 
Europe (SHARE) that samples from populations aged 50+. For older populations, education is a better indicator 
of long-term SES than income, which has been used in most previous European studies of inequity in health 
care utilisation (Van Doorslaer et al, 2000; Van Doorslaer et al, 2004; Bago d’Uva et al, 2009). Besides being a 
proxy for socioeconomic inequality, education disparities are of direct interest because of the strong 
association that exists between education and health (Smith and Kington, 1997; Mackenbach et al., 2008; 
Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2008). There is growing evidence from high-income countries that this relationship 
has a causal basis (Lleras-Muney, 2005; Oreopoulos, 2006; Van Kippersluis et al, 2009), unlike that between 
financial resources and health (Frijters et al, 2005; Smith, 2007). A potential causal mechanism is differential 
utilisation of medical care by education, which could run through income and health insurance coverage, 
and/or through the acquisition and utilisation of information on medical conditions and treatments (Glied and 
Lleras-Muney, 2008). One US study finds an education advantage in adoption of the most recent medicines that 
is not affected by control for income and health insurance coverage (Lleras-Muney and Lichtenberg, 2005). In 
the European context of universal and mostly publicly funded health insurance, financial barriers are likely to be 
even less important, relative to information, in explaining any education gradient in the use of medical care. 
Our aim in this paper is to establish the extent of the education disparity in utilisation, irrespective of the 
mechanisms through which it may operate, and so we purposefully do not control for income or supplementary 
health insurance coverage.  
 There are reasons to expect styles of reporting health to vary by education. Superior information 
acquisition skills possessed by more highly educated individuals increase the likelihood that they will recognise 
and report symptoms of disease. The strong correlation between health and education may generate peer 
effects, with low and high educated individuals reporting health relative to the average level observed among 
their respective associates. Both arguments imply that the higher educated will report their health more 
negatively. One strategy that has been adopted to test this hypothesis is to check whether self-reported health 
is a stronger predictor of mortality for more highly educated individuals. The evidence from both Europe and 
the US is mixed (Beam and Zajacova, 2007; Huisman et al,  2007; Jurges, 2008; Singh-Manoux et al, 2007). 
Adopting a different strategy, Lindeboom and Van Doorslaer (2004) find no education-related variation in 
reported health in Canada after conditioning on a presumed sufficiently comprehensive and objective indicator 
of health – the McMaster Health Utility Index. Vignettes offer a more direct test. Using the same SHARE data 
that are employed in the present paper, Bago d’Uva et al (2008) find that the more highly educated rate the 
health of vignette descriptions more severely in six of the eight countries examined. On the basis of this 
4 
 
evidence, we can predict that an observed education gradient in the response of health care demand to a given 
reported level of health will understate the true extent to which the better educated make greater use of health 
care for a given health condition. In this paper, we estimate the magnitude of this bias.      
 With one exception (Kapteyn et al, 2009), previous applications of the vignettes approach have been 
concerned with identification of and correction for reporting heterogeneity in the context of a descriptive 
analysis of the distribution of the error-ridden variable (eg, King et al, 2004; Kapteyn et al, 2007; Bago d’Uva et 
al, 2008). To our knowledge, this is only the second study to use vignettes to correct for measurement error in 
an independent variable and it is the first to do so in modelling health and health care. This involves 
development of a joint model of health care utilisation and health reporting.  
Identification of reporting heterogeneity using vignettes rests on two assumptions – vignette 
equivalence and response consistency (see section 3.3). In a previous paper, we present evidence against both 
assumptions in the health domains of mobility and cognition for a sample of the older population of England 
(Bago d’Uva et al, 2009). These results cast some doubt on the validity of the approach and call for refinement 
of its implementation. In the present paper, we do not examine the method’s validity but simply ask what 
impact it has when applied. A priori we expect that education-related inequity is underestimated when no 
account is taken of differences in reporting styles. In this context it is interesting to know whether the use of 
vignettes to ‘correct’ reporting heterogeneity shifts the estimates in the expected direction and by how much it 
does so. A partial, but by no means complete, alternative to vignettes is to instrument self-reported health 
using more objective health indicators (Bound, 1991). We examine the marginal impact of using vignettes to 
explicitly estimate systematic variation in reporting scales, in addition to exploiting objective health indicators. 
This allows us to gauge the marginal return to inclusion of a vignettes module in a health survey, in addition to 
measures of physical functioning, such as grip strength, and data on chronic conditions. 
The next section describes the SHARE data. Following that, we propose a model of doctor visits as a 
function of medical need and explain how both objective health indicators and vignettes can be used to 
reduced bias resulting from the use of self-rated health as a proxy for need. Section 4 presents our findings on 
the extent to which the two corrections for measurement error in need impact on the estimation of education-
related inequity in primary and specialist care. The final section concludes. 
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2. DATA 
2.1 SAMPLE 
SHARE randomly samples from populations aged 50 years and over (plus spouses) in 12 countries (Börsch-
Supan et al, 2005a). We use data from the first wave collected in 2004-05 (release version 2.0). Vignettes data 
were collected from supplementary probability samples, which also completed the full SHARE questionnaire, in 
all but four countries (Börsch-Supan et al, 2005b). The overall response rate in the vignette samples was 57.7% - 
highest in France (77%) and lowest in Belgium (42%). The countries where the vignettes were fielded and the 
respective sample sizes are as follows: Belgium (n=531), France (n=773), Germany (n=468), Greece (n=646), 
Italy (n=397), The Netherlands (n=489), Spain (n=414) and Sweden (n=380). We pooled these samples to give a 
total sample of 4098 individuals. Despite the fact that the sample size relative to population differs across 
countries, we do not apply weights to make the sample representative of the cross-country population. For 
modelling purposes, this is not necessary provided one conditions on country indicators. 
2.2 HEALTH CARE UTILISATION 
We examine variation both in the number of visits to a General Practitioner (GP) and visits to a specialist. 
Respondents are asked to report the number of times they saw or spoke with a medical doctor about their 
health in the last twelve months. A reminder is given of the month last year from which they should count. They 
are told exclude dental care and hospital stays but to include consultations in the emergency room and 
outpatient clinics. Of the total number of visits recorded, they are asked how many were with a GP or a doctor 
at a health centre. We use this as our measure of GP visits. The remainder is used as the measure of specialist 
visits.  
 While there is likely to be measurement error in the recall of the number of doctor visits over a period 
of one year, there is no obvious reason why this should be correlated with education, particularly since we 
control for cognition. Nonetheless, it should be kept in mind that, as with all previous studies, any correlated 
measurement error would bias the estimated education-related inequity in doctor visits.   
 The frequency of visiting a GP is highest in Italy, at just less than seven visits on average per year, and 
lowest in Sweden, where, on average, older individuals visit less than twice per year (Table 1). The standard 
deviation is generally large relative to the mean, particularly in Greece, Italy and Spain. In all countries except 
Greece, the Netherlands and Sweden, 80-90% of individuals consult a GP at least once a year. It is the low 
probability of any contact that is responsible for the relatively low mean number of visits in Greece, while both 
the probability and the intensity of visiting are low in both the Netherlands and Sweden. Mean visits are high in 
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Italy because of their intensity among those who make any consultation. Some substitution is suggested by the 
fact that Italy also has the lowest mean number of visits to a specialist. Spain, another country in which the GP 
acts as a gatekeeper to specialist care, also has a relatively low ratio of mean specialist to GP visits. But the 
Netherlands also operates a GP gatekeeper system and has the highest such ratio. Sweden is striking in having 
the lowest mean number of consultations with both GPs and specialists. Around 40% of the sample consults 
with a specialist each year in all of the other countries except Belgium and Germany, where more than half do 
so. Both GP and specialist visits are highly skewed with a few individuals consulting the doctor almost every 
week in most countries, and twice per week in some cases. 
Table 1 here 
2.3 EDUCATION & DEMOGRAPHICS 
Educational attainment is measured according to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 
97) as: (i) finished at most primary education or first stage of basic education (ISCED 0-1 - primary); (ii) lower 
secondary or second stage of basic education (ISCED 2 – lower secondary), (iii) upper secondary education 
(ISCED 3-4 – upper secondary) and (iv) recognized third level education, which includes higher vocational 
education and university degree (ISCED 5-6 - tertiary) (UNESCO, 1997). In the case of Germany the data do not 
distinguish between levels (i) and (ii). The lowest education group is used as the reference category. As 
explained in the introduction, the purpose of the analysis is to measure education-related disparities in health 
care use conditional only on medical need. We therefore control only for indicators of health, age and gender. 
Exploratory analysis found no evidence of significant urban/rural differences in either health reporting or health 
care utilisation. Given the very small size of the rural samples in two countries (Greece and Spain), and the 
possibility that location is determined by education, we do not control for this characteristic. 
2.4 SELF-REPORTED HEALTH AND VIGNETTES 
A self-completion drop off questionnaire covered self-assessments of health and vignette ratings. Respondents 
were asked to rate problems or difficulties experienced in the preceding 30 days in each of six health domains – 
mobility, cognition, pain, sleep, breathing and emotional health – on a five-point scale running from none to 
extreme. The questions referred to problems/difficulties with: moving around (mobility); concentrating or 
remembering things (cognition); bodily aches or pains (pain); falling asleep, interrupted sleep or waking early 
(sleep); shortness of breath (breathing); feeling sad, low, or depressed (emotional health). For more detail on 
these questions and the choice of health domains the reader is referred to Bago d’Uva et al (2008) and 
references therein. 
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 After rating their own health, respondents were presented with three vignettes within each domain, 
each of which is a brief description of a case corresponding to a given level of difficulty in that domain (see 
http://ije.oxfordjournals.org/content/37/6/1375/suppl/DC1). The respondent was asked to rate the level of 
difficulty, or problem, represented by each vignette using the same five response categories used to rate own-
health. One of two versions of the vignettes module – differing in the implied genders (names) of the vignette 
and their ordering - was randomly assigned to respondents.  
 Ratings of the vignettes do indicate that reporting styles vary by education. To illustrate, in Table 2 we 
present the proportion of respondents across all countries who classify the vignette intended to correspond to 
the middle level of difficulty within each domain as experiencing none or mild difficulty. The proportions are 
standardised for age, gender and country and so do not reflect education-related differences in these 
characteristics. With the exception of cognition, there is a clear tendency for the lower education groups to be 
more likely to consider the health condition described in the vignette as being one that presents no, or only a 
mild degree, of difficulty. For example, while 24% of those with only primary level education consider pain in 
the arm that is relieved in the evening after work to represent no more than a mild (pain) problem, only 16% 
with tertiary education are so sanguine.  
Table 2 here 
 In a related paper using the SHARE data (Bago d’Uva et al, 2008), some of us showed the implications 
of these education-related differences in health reporting for measurement of heath inequality. This analysis 
revealed significant reporting differences by education in 29 out of 48 domain-country cases examined, with 
the higher educated more likely to rate a given health state negatively. Correcting these differences generally 
increased measured inequality and resulted in the emergence of significant health disparities to the advantage 
of the better educated in 18 cases. Spain and Sweden displayed different patterns of health reporting by 
education. In the present study, we take account of such cross-country variation not only by allowing health 
reporting to vary by country but also permitting the education differences in reporting to vary by country.  
2.5 HEALTH INDICATORS 
Education-related differences in the propensity to report health problems is further evident from variation in 
objective health indicators within given categories of self-rated health. This is illustrated in Table 3 for the 
domains of mobility, cognition and depression. In each case, lower educated individuals score worse on 
corresponding objective measures of health than do higher educated individuals. This is true after standardizing 
for differences in age, gender and the proportion of respondents from each country across the education 
categories. For example, among individuals reporting no problems with mobility, measured mean grip strength, 
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a predictor of mobility limitations (Rantanen et al, 1999) as well as mortality (Rantanen et al, 2003; and 
references therein),  is 34.8 for those with no more than primary education but 35.6 for those with tertiary level 
education. Even larger differences are observed for those reporting moderate problems with mobility. Among 
individuals reporting severe or extreme difficulty concentrating or remembering things, 36% of those with no 
more than primary education, but only 15% of those with tertiary education, are found to have some difficulty 
recalling the date, month, year or day of the week. Of the sample respondents reporting severe or extreme 
problems with feelings of sadness or depression, 66% of those with primary education versus 57% of those with 
tertiary education are identified as depression cases using the EURO-D depression scale (Prince et al, 1999). 
Table 3 here 
 We exploit the health indicators for two main purposes. First, the additional health variables allow us 
to predict health within each domain from a model of reported health as a function of objective indicators and 
then substitute these predictions in a model of doctor visits. This instrumental variable approach removes 
errors-in-variables bias from the estimated effect of need on doctor visits (Bound, 1991). Second, the six health 
domains are unlikely to be fully comprehensive in capturing needs for primary and specialist medical care. 
Some dimensions of health - notably sight and hearing problems - are not covered by the six domains. Chronic 
conditions may be under medical management that requires regular consultation with a doctor for check-up 
and prescription of medication and yet be sufficiently well contained such that related health problems or 
difficulties are not reported.  
 The structural framework we adopt is one in which an individual consults a doctor either in response 
to a symptom, which may provoke reporting of a health problem within one of the six health domains, or for 
continued management of a chronic condition. Consistent with this, we specify doctor visits as a function of the 
need for curative care and for disease management, which are proxied by the six health domains and a list of 
diagnosed chronic conditions respectively. For each domain, self-rated health is specified as a function only of 
indicators that are symptoms of a health condition or disease within that domain, or that identify such a 
condition/disease. In the presence of comorbidities, an indicator may be correlated with reported health in a 
domain without being a symptom of any recognised medical condition within that domain. For example, in the 
SHARE data grip strength is correlated with cognitive problems. We do not, however, use grip strength to 
explain reported cognitive functioning since it is not a symptom of any cognitive problem for which medical 
advice may be sought. Following this logic, the choice of indicators per domain, which is listed in Table 4, was 
made following expert medical advice. The table also lists the diagnosed conditions that are permitted to 
impact on doctor visits directly, and not only through one or more of the health domains. 
Table 4 here   
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3. JOINT MODEL OF DOCTOR VISITS AND HEALTH REPORTING   
3.1 IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM 
Our aim is to test for education-related variation in doctor visits conditional on a defined level of medical need. 
The problem is that need is fundamentally unobservable and its mis-measurement is likely to induce bias in the 
estimated education effect. This is analogous to the identification problem examined by Bound (1991) in the 
context of estimating (unobserved) disability and wage effects on labour supply. Let doctor visits (y) be 
determined as follows, y=y(η1,η2,Ε), where η1 represents need for treatment of current health problems and 
symptoms, η2 is need for the medical management of diagnosed chronic conditions and E is education.  
Obviously, other determinants could be added. We will assume there is no problem with measurement of the 
second type of need. The set of diagnosed conditions listed in Table 4 is presumed to comprehensively 
represent all those for which an individual may consult for medication or check-up. Self-reported health 
problems (h) are potential proxies for the first type of need. There are two problems with this approach. First, 
substituting h for η1 in a model of doctor visits will introduce errors-in-variables that will result in an 
underestimation of the need effect and will spill over to biased estimation of the education effect unless, 
conditional on self-rated health, there is no correlation between education and need. Second, as illustrated in 
Tables 2 and 3, it is likely that reporting styles vary with education, such that h=h(η1,E). This introduces an 
endogeneity bias to the estimated education effect on doctor visits that will be present even in the absence of 
any errors-in-variables bias.  
Using objective health indicators, such as those listed in Table 4, to instrument self-rated health in a 
model of doctor visits does not solve the problem provided there is education-related reporting heterogeneity. 
The need effect would be consistently estimated but the education effect would not. As Bound (1991) 
demonstrates, such a model is only identified in the presence of outside information about reporting 
behaviour. We use vignettes to identify that information and then impose it in a model of doctor visits as a 
function of education and a measure of need purged of reporting heterogeneity. We compare the estimates 
from this model with those from two others. The first uses the raw self-rated health variables to proxy need 
and is vulnerable to bias both from errors-in-variables and from education-related reporting errors. The second 
instruments self-rated health with objective indicators and so deals with the first bias but not the second.  
3.2 HURDLE MODEL OF DOCTOR VISITS 
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 1 reveal a substantial proportion of individuals report no doctor 
visits, particularly specialist consultations, in the last year. In order to allow for the likelihood that the stochastic 
process responsible for observing zero visits differs from that generating a positive number of visits, we 
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estimate a hurdle model consisting of a logit specification of the probability of any visits and a truncated 
negative binomial 2 specification in the positive range of visits (Grootendorst, 1995; Gurmu, 1998; Winkelman, 
2004). Let yi denote the number of visits to the doctor (GP or specialist) made by individual i in the last year and 
di=1(yi>0), where 1() is the indicator function. The probability of observing a given number of doctor visits is 
(Gurmu, 1998; Winkelman, 2004), 
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exp , 1,2si i s sX β , (.) is the gamma function and denotes an over-dispersion parameter that is 
estimated. It is assumed that the two parts of the model (i.e. the participation decision and the positive number 
of visits) are stochastically independent and so the log-likelihood factors into two components that can be 
estimated separately.   
The vector Xi includes four types of variables: i) education, ii) demographics and country indicators, iii) 
health specific to the six reported domains (Hi), and iv) diagnosed health conditions or diseases. Education is 
interacted with the country indicators in the more flexible models estimated. We estimate the model using 
alternative sets of domain-specific health variables. First, we simply use the chosen category within each of the 
health domains, 
1 2, ,...,i i i DiH H H H . In this case, self-reports are taken at face value and the estimates 
are vulnerable to both types of bias referred to above. Presuming doctor visits increase with true medical need 
and, as is likely, need is negatively correlated education, then the errors-in-variables bias will result in an 
underestimation of the effect of education on doctor visits (Bound, 1991, p.111). If the better educated 
understate their health, then this will further bias the education effect downwards. The degree of the latter 
bias will increase both with the degree of reporting heterogeneity and with the responsiveness of health care 
use to need. 
Our second approach is to proxy need for curative care with domain-specific health scores derived 
from ordered probit models of self-rated health as a function of more objective health indicators, as well as 
education, demographics and country indicators.  The category reported in domain d, diH , is assumed to be 
generated by the position of a latent health index *
diH , specified as  
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 * ,        , ~ 0,1di di d i d di di di iH | NZ δ Wγ Z W , (2) 
relative to a set of fixed cut-points   1 1... Kd d , such that,  
 1 *   if   , 1,....k kdi d di dH k H k K  (3) 
where Zdi is the corresponding vector of health indicators listed in Table 4 and Wi includes education, age, sex 
and country (interacted with education). The predicted latent health scores from these models, 
* * *
1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,....i i i DiH H HH
, are entered into the hurdle model for doctor visits.  
 Besides non-linearity, identification relies on the exclusion of health indicators from the model of 
doctor visits. The exclusion restrictions follow from the presumption that individuals consult either for the 
treatment of current symptoms in the six health domains or for management of chronic conditions. All health 
indicators other than diagnosed chronic conditions are permitted to impact on utilisation only through health 
problems in the six health domains. For example, conditional on mobility problems, grip strength is assumed to 
have no direct influence doctor visits. Cognitive test scores are presumed to influence consultations only 
through problems of concentration and memory. The (excluded) instruments for each health domain are given 
by the indicators listed in the respective row of Table 4, with the exceptions of those also appearing in the 
bottom row that enter the doctor visits model directly.   
Constancy of the cut-points across individuals implies an assumption of reporting homogeneity. If this 
does not hold, in particular, if the cut-points vary with some of the covariates, then the predicted health scores 
will reflect not only information on true health but also variation in the reporting of that health. So, while this 
instrumental variables approach corrects errors-in-variables bias deriving from the mis-measurement of need, 
it does nothing to deal with the bias due to education-related reporting errors. Under the assumptions stated 
above, the education effect will continue to be underestimated, although not to the same extent as when raw 
self-reported health is used to proxy need. 
3.3HETEROGENEOUS REPORTING BEHAVIOUR  
Our third specification of the domain-specific health variables uses predictions of latent health scores from an 
extended ordered probit model in which the reporting thresholds are made functions of individual 
characteristics and so the parameters of the latent index represent true health effects, and not a mixture of 
health and reporting effects. This hierarchical ordered probit (HOPIT) model (King et al, 2004) is identified using 
the information from the vignette ratings. Validity of the approach rests on two assumptions - vignette 
equivalence and response consistency. The first corresponds to the assumption that, up to random 
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measurement error, all respondents understand the vignette description as corresponding to the same level of 
functioning on a uni-dimensional scale. This is required in order that responses to a given vignette can be 
interpreted as reflecting heterogeneity in the reporting of a given level of functioning. In the present context, 
the assumption is made more plausible by the separation of health into six domains with vignettes being rated 
within each of these. It does require that language translation does not distort vignette descriptions, resulting 
in differences in their interpretation across countries. Given improvement of cross-country comparability was 
the main motivation for the inclusion of vignettes in SHARE, one presumes sufficient care was taken with their 
translation. The second assumption is that respondents rate the vignettes in the same way as they do their own 
health. If this did not hold then it would not be valid to impose the thresholds identified from the vignettes 
ratings on the reporting of own health, and so the true health effects would not be identified. To date, there 
has been little formal testing of these identifying assumptions. On vignette equivalence, see Murray et al 
(2003), Kirstensen and Johansson (2008), Bago d’Uva et al (2009), and Rice et al (2009). On response 
consistency, see Van Soest et al (2007), Bago d’Uva et al (2009) and Datta Gupta et al (2010). 
Under the assumption of vignette equivalence, the perceived latent health level of vignette j in domain 
d, jdiV , depends solely on an indicator of the vignette and random error (and not on characteristics of the 
respondent): 
 ,        ~ 0,1jdi jd jdi jdiV N . (4) 
The observed vignette ratings jdiV  relate to jdiV  through the thresholds:  
 1   if   0,...., ,k kjdi di jdi diV k τ V τ , k K  (5) 
1 1... Kdi di , which are now defined as functions of the same covariates that enter the latent 
index of own-health in (2), 
 k k k
di di d i dZ θ Wφ  (6) 
 Inclusion of the individual’s characteristics in the cut-points is possible because the assumption of 
vignette equivalence ensures that all the systematic variation in the vignette ratings can be attributed to 
reporting behaviour. In principle, it would be possible to include an error term in (6) representing unobservable 
heterogeneity in reporting styles. We do not do so since there are only three vignette ratings within each 
domain from which to identify the individual effects. With relatively small samples identification is likely to be 
weak.   
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 Under the assumption of response consistency, the same heterogeneous cut-points govern the 
observation mechanism that relates latent own-health,
diH , to the observed categorical response, diH . It is 
assumed that the error terms in the vignette and own latent health equations, jdi and di respectively, are 
independent for all i, j and d. King and Wand (2007) introduce a nonparametric method of analyzing vignettes 
data that, while maintaining the basic assumptions of vignette equivalence and response consistency, avoids the 
distributional assumptions of the HOPIT model. 
 The predicted latent own-health scores from the HOPIT model are used to proxy need for curative care 
in the hurdle model of doctor visits. By both instrumenting reported health with objective indicators and 
purging reporting heterogeneity using the vignettes, this procedures deals with both sources of bias that are 
present when the raw self-reports are used to proxy need. Since both biases are expected to be downward, we 
expect the education effects estimated using this need proxy to be largest. In addition to the exclusion 
restrictions on the health indicators and the vignette equivalence and response consistency assumptions, 
identification also requires that the vignette ratings do not directly explain doctor consultations. The latter 
implies that perceptions of health in general, as opposed to perceptions of own health, do not impact on health 
care seeking behaviour. While it by no means amounts to a formal test, we found no evidence of any effect of 
the vignette responses when these were entered into a model of doctor visits. 
 In order to take account of the sampling variability of the predicted health scores that are used in the 
hurdle models of doctor visits, we bootstrap the whole procedure, using 50 replications, to obtain standard 
errors. 
 
4. RESULTS 
Estimates of the ordered probit and HOPIT models are not presented. Using the same SHARE data, estimates of 
education-related disparities in each of the six self-reported health domains with and without adjustment for 
reporting heterogeneity using the HOPIT model are presented in Bago d’Uva et al (2008). Hurdle models are 
estimated separately for GP and specialist visits. In addition to need for curative care proxied in three 
alternative ways from self-rated health, all models include the full set of diagnosed conditions listed in Table 4, 
as well as age, gender, country dummies and education. Only the education coefficients are presented in Tables 
5-8, both from restricted models in which the education effects are held constant across countries and from 
more flexible models in which they are allowed to vary.   
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4.1 GENERAL PRACTITIONER VISITS 
The top panel of Table 5 gives the education coefficients, constrained to be equal across countries, from logit 
models of the binary decision to visit a GP. Using the reported category within each health domain, without 
instrumenting using health indicators or purging reporting heterogeneity using vignettes, to proxy need for 
curative care (results columns 1-3), individuals with tertiary level education appear significantly less likely than 
those with no more than primary education to visit a GP. If one were to presume that self-rated health and 
diagnosed conditions are adequate proxies for need, then this would indicate inequity in access to GP care to 
the disadvantage of the better educated. However, when self-rated health is instrumented using the objective 
health indicators (columns 4-6), the magnitude of the coefficient on tertiary education falls and it loses 
significance. Correcting, in addition, for reporting heterogeneity using predictions of health from HOPIT models 
identified from the vignettes results in a further large fall in the magnitude and significance of the coefficient on 
tertiary education. In this specification, the education categories are clearly not jointly significant. The loss of 
significance of education is not due to increases in the standard errors, which are relatively constant across the 
specifications. It is the fall in the magnitude of the tertiary education effect that is responsible. The positive 
coefficients on the secondary education categories increase as more adjustments are made to the reported 
health variables but they never reach significance. These results are entirely consistent with our predictions 
that using self-rated health to proxy need will bias estimates away from showing an educational advantage in 
health care use due both to errors-in-variables and education-correlated reporting errors and that 
instrumenting reported health using objective health indicators will only partially correct the bias.  
 The tests at the foot of the table indicate that the restricted model is rejected relative to one that 
allows education effects to vary by country. For most countries, the results are broadly consistent with those 
from the restricted model. There is an apparent lower propensity for the higher education groups to consult 
with a GP when raw self-rated health is used to proxy need, which is eroded as reported health is instrumented 
and then corrected for reporting heterogeneity. This pattern is most apparent for Belgium, France, Greece and 
Spain. The Netherlands is clearly an exception. Even using raw self-rated health there is some evidence that 
higher education groups are more likely than those with primary education to visit the GP. When adjustment is 
made for reporting heterogeneity, but not so much when self-rated health is instrumented, the pro-higher 
education advantage becomes much more marked both in magnitude and significance. Sweden also starts off 
with some indication of an advantage to the better educated. Note that the average probability of visiting a GP 
is lower in Sweden and the Netherlands than in all other countries but for Greece (Table 1). It could be that the 
higher educated are less constrained by the more restricted access to GP services. Unlike the Netherlands, the 
education disparity does not rise in Sweden when adjustment is made for reporting heterogeneity. This is 
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because the reporting bias is in the opposite direction in Sweden – the higher educated are less likely to report 
a given condition as representing a health problem (Bago d’Uva et al, 2008).   
 Results from the truncated negative binomial model of the (positive) number of GP visits are even 
more consistent with our expectations about the effect of correcting measurement error (Table 6). In the 
results from the model with no education-country interactions there are no significant education effects when 
self-rated health is used to proxy need. The coefficients of all three education categories increase when 
reported health is instrumented using objective health indicators and it emerges that those with upper 
secondary education visit the GP significantly more than those with primary schooling. Adjusting for reporting 
heterogeneity leads to large increases in the coefficients and all three become significant. On average across 
countries, GP utilisation is significantly greater for all education groups in comparison with the least educated. 
There is clear evidence of inequity in the intensity of GP care that is not evident when reported health 
categories are used to proxy need. 
 The tendency for a higher education bias to become more evident as cumulative adjustments are 
made to self-rated health is apparent for most countries, particularly Belgium, Greece and the Netherlands, 
although significance is much lower due to the small cell sizes in the models with country-education 
interactions. In France and Italy the results are similar to those from the logit model – an apparent disparity to 
the disadvantage of the highest education group is removed once account is taken of the tendency of the highly 
educated to report their health more negatively. Greece is the country with the greatest education-related 
inequality in GP visits. It also has one of the lowest mean rates of GP consultation (Table 1), possibly reflecting 
both the lack of a family doctor service and the very heavy reliance on out-of-pocket payments for health care 
(OECD, 2010). While primary care is free to those with public health insurance, long waiting times for 
consultations may lead patients, at least those prepared to pay, to turn to providers who do not accept public 
insurance patients. 
Tables 5 & 6 
4.2 SPECIALIST VISITS 
Consistent with the findings of previous European studies (Van Doorslaer et al, 2000; Van Doorslaer et al, 2004), 
access to specialist care displays greater bias in favour of higher education groups that does GP care. On 
average across countries, the probability of seeing a specialist rises significantly and monotonically with 
education even when self-rated health in used to proxy need (Table 7, top panel, columns 1-3). Instrumenting 
with health indicators using an ordered probit model of reported health has little impact on the education 
effects, which remain highly significant (columns 4-6). Adjusting for reporting heterogeneity using the HOPIT 
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model does increase the coefficients, particularly for the top education category. So, again, there appears to be 
a marginal impact of using the vignettes to correct for reporting heterogeneity over and above that achieved by 
exploiting information on objective health indicators.  
 Unlike for GP care, the likelihood ratio tests do not indicate substantial cross-country variation in the 
education effects on specialist care (Table 7 bottom row). Indeed, the consistent educational advantage in 
access to specialist care is striking. Even using raw self-rated health to proxy need, there is a significant 
education gradient in the probability of accessing specialist care in every country except the Netherlands, which 
stands out by having a gradient in access to GP, but not specialist, care. This is consistent with GP gatekeepers 
in the Netherlands being effective in ensuring equitable access to specialist care, possibly withstanding pressure 
from higher social groups seeking privileged access. See Bago d’Uva and Jones (2009) for further discussion of 
the role of gatekeepers, and other European health system characteristics, in explaining inequality in the 
distribution of GP and specialist visits. In general, the country-specific education effects on the probability of 
using specialist care increase when adjustment is made for reporting heterogeneity. 
 The impact of education on the number of specialist visits is very different from that on the probability 
of having at least one visit. Conditional on coming into contact with a specialist, there is little or no evidence 
that the intensity of consultations varies systematically with education (Table 8). In the restricted model with 
homogeneous education effects, the education coefficients move in the direction of an education advantage 
when adjustment is made for measurement error in reported health, but they do not come close to reaching 
significance. As with the binary specialist decision, homogeneity of the education effects across countries is not 
clearly and consistently rejected. After adjustment for reporting heterogeneity, but not before, at least one of 
the education groups use specialist care more intensively than those with primary education only in Belgium, 
France, Italy and the Netherlands. The lack of significance of the effects in this model could be due to the 
smaller sample size, given that less than half of respondents use specialist care. But analysis of data from the 
European Community Household Panel Survey (ECHP) also reveals larger income elasticities in the probability of 
contacting a specialist than in the conditional number of contacts (Bago d’Uva and Jones, 2009). It is plausible 
that inequity is at the extensive rather than the intensive margin. Consistent with the hypothesis advanced in 
the introduction that information disparities may be responsible for the education gradient in health and health 
care, the lower education groups may lack information on the type of specialist care from which they could 
benefit and consequently fail to make contact with an appropriate specialist. But once contact is made, the 
doctor will be largely responsible for the course of treatment and the number of consultations. On this 
interpretation, the problem is not one of unequal treatment of equal presented need but unequal presentation 
for treatment. That is, the problem is on the demand side rather than the supply side. 
Tables 7 & 8 here 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Equal treatment for equal need is a founding principle of many European health care systems. Monitoring the 
performance of systems with respect to this goal is a major challenge. A weakness of previous research has 
been the failure to identify individuals in equal need using the self-reported health measures typically available 
in large household surveys. In this paper, we addressed this weakness by using two methods to correct bias in 
the estimated education gradient in doctor visits conditional on need. The first approach instruments self-rated 
health with objective health indicators. This deals with bias arising from the fact that self-rated health is an 
imperfect proxy for medical care need. The second method goes a step further by purging self-rated health of 
education-related reporting errors using information on reporting styles from the rating of health vignettes.  
 Analysis of SHARE data on elderly Europeans confirms it is likely that bias is present in studies that use 
self-rated health as a proxy for need with the goal of estimating inequity in the distribution of doctor visits. 
Instrumenting self-reported health with objective health indicators generally shifts the distribution of health 
care conditional on measured need in the direction of inequality favouring more highly educated groups. There 
is a further, and typically larger, shift the same direction when correction is made for the observed tendency of 
the more highly educated to rate their health more negatively. On average across countries, while the 
probability of contacting a General Practitioner conditional on self-rated health is lower for the higher 
educated, this perverse inequity is no longer apparent when self-rated health is purged of both sources of bias. 
Using self-rated health to proxy need, there is no apparent inequality in the number of GP visits. But inequity to 
the advantage of the better educated emerges when corrections are made to reported health. The probability 
of accessing specialist care displays inequity to the advantage of the better educated even without any 
correction for measurement error, but the disparity becomes even larger once differential reporting thresholds 
are taken into account. 
 These results are a warning against complacency in the equity performance of European health 
systems. The distribution of primary care is perhaps not as equitable as is often believed and specialist care is 
even less equitably distributed than has hitherto been realised. But the implications of the results potentially 
stretch beyond the monitoring of inequity to the understanding of its causes. With universal coverage ensured 
and relatively low financial barriers to access in most European countries, one may rightly wonder how it can 
possibly be that equity remains an elusive goal. Our hypothesis is that variation in health expectations, as 
reflected in the rating of vignettes, at least in part, drives inequality in the utilisation of health care. Given that 
the better educated report a given level of health more negatively, it seems likely that they will also be quicker 
to seek health care for any given condition. Viewed in this way, reporting heterogeneity is not simply a nuisance 
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to be purged from health measures in order to better evaluate equity in health care use, it is potentially an 
important factor in improving understanding of health seeking behaviour.  
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TABLES 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of General Practitioner and Specialist visits by country  
 
General Practitioner visits 
 
Specialist visits 
 
Mean Std. Dev. P(visits>0)
† 
Mean|visits>0
‡ 
Max. 
 
Mean Std. Dev. P(visits>0) Mean|visits>0 Max. 
Belgium 5.011 5.613 0.887 5.650 53 
 
2.215 4.833 0.544 4.069 54 
France 4.886 4.573 0.891 5.482 50 
 
1.551 2.865 0.468 3.312 34 
Germany 4.154 4.820 0.870 4.776 49 
 
2.667 5.013 0.575 4.639 60 
Greece 3.043 4.571 0.605 5.028 36 
 
1.944 5.407 0.390 4.984 73 
Italy 6.662 10.756 0.811 8.214 98 
 
1.446 3.070 0.406 3.565 30 
Netherlands 2.145 2.431 0.767 2.797 24 
 
1.573 4.844 0.405 3.884 89 
Spain 6.246 9.484 0.845 7.389 90 
 
1.942 6.055 0.440 4.418 98 
Sweden 1.655 2.274 0.650 2.547 26 
 
0.971 2.901 0.316 3.075 40 
Total 4.211 6.155 0.794 5.307 98 
 
1.805 4.519 0.447 4.034 98 
† Proportion with any visit. ‡ Mean visits among those with any visit. 
 
Table 2: Proportion of respondents who classify vignette corresponding to the middle level of 
difficulty in each domain as having "none" or "mild" difficulty by educational level† 
ISCED Education Category Mobility Cognition Pain Sleep Breathing 
Emotional 
Health 
 Primary 0.1669 0.3172 0.2398 0.1372 0.1032 0.1821 
 Lower secondary 0.1503 0.3355 0.2030 0.1248 0.0626 0.1554 
 Upper secondary 0.1226 0.3235 0.1950 0.0932 0.0668 0.1404 
 Tertiary 0.1009 0.3118 0.1600 0.1008 0.0465 0.1236 
†Cross-country pooled sample. Rates are standardised for age, gender and country. 
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Table 3: Means of objective health indicators by education and self-rated health† 
 
  
ISCED Education Category 
   
 
 
Primary Lower Secondary Upper Secondary Tertiary 
 
Observations 
Mean grip strength 
      
 
Self-rated mobility problem 
     
 
None 34.7882 35.1748 35.6109 35.5989 
 
2440 
 
Mild 33.3737 33.3920 35.0635 34.3488 
 
913 
 
Moderate 31.4700 31.7039 32.5558 34.4061 
 
515 
 
Severe / Extreme 29.7960 32.7974 29.1409 30.2602 
 
230 
Proportion with less than very good orientation in time (score on date recall test) 
  
 
Self-rated difficulty concentrating /remembering  
    
 
None 0.1066 0.0791 0.0588 0.0936 
 
1834 
 
Mild 0.1430 0.1203 0.0798 0.0884 
 
1445 
 
Moderate 0.2021 0.2072 0.1644 0.0914 
 
653 
 
Severe / Extreme 0.3646 0.2765 0.1599 0.1514 
 
166 
Proportion identified as depressed on EURO-D scale (Prince et al, 1999) 
  
 
Self-rated problem of sadness/depression 
    
 
None 0.1094 0.0946 0.0783 0.0747 
 
2068 
 
Mild 0.2683 0.2682 0.2674 0.2034 
 
1172 
 
Moderate 0.5445 0.5935 0.4744 0.4736 
 
590 
 
Severe / Extreme 0.6662 0.6756 0.6028 0.5775 
 
275 
 
Observations 1402 780 1154 762 
 
4098 
†Cross-country pooled sample. Standardised for age, gender and country. 
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Table 4: Health indicators used to predict latent health within each domain and diagnosed 
conditions permitted to directly influence doctor visits 
Health Domain Health Indicators 
Mobility i) whether obese ; ii) maximum grip strength; iii) # limitations in Activities of Daily Living; iv) # 
limitations in mobility, arm function and fine motor function; v) whether has any of the following 
diagnoses: stroke, arthritis/rheumatism, hip/femoral fracture or Parkinson’s disease; vi) whether has 
any of the following symptoms: swollen legs, falling down, fear of falling down, dizziness, faints or 
blackouts  
Cognition All five measured tests of cognitive functioning performed by SHARE respondents: i) orientation in time 
(score of date recall test); ii) & iii) immediate and delayed word recall
†
; iv) word-finding and verbal 
fluency (# animals named within time interval); v) numeracy
‡
 
Pain i) whether bothered by pain in back, knees, hips or other joints; ii) whether takes medication for joint 
pain or inflammation (d); iii) whether takes medication for other pain or for stomach burn; iv) whether 
has any of the following diagnoses: cancer
§
, stomach, duodenal or peptic ulcer, arthritis or rheumatism, 
hip or femoral fracture 
Sleep i) whether Euro-D depression score (Prince et al, 1999) indicates trouble with sleeping; ii) whether is 
bothered by sleeping problems; iii) whether takes medication for sleeping problems; iv) whether 
obese; v) whether has any of the following diagnoses: asthma, bronchitis, etc.,  cancer of oral cavity, 
larynx, pharynx and lung (dropping cases diagnosed longer than 5 years ago) 
Breathing i) whether is bothered by breathlessness; ii) whether bothered by persistent cough; iii) whether has 
diagnosis of chronic lung disease or asthma; iv) whether takes medication  for asthma and/or chronic 
bronchitis  
Emotional Health i) score on Euro-D depression scale (Prince et al, 1999); ii) whether takes medication for depression  
Diagnosed conditions permitted to directly explain doctor visits 
Whether has 
i) heart attack or other heart problems; ii) high blood pressure; iii) high blood cholesterol; iv) stroke or 
cerebral vascular disease; v) diabetes; vi) chronic lung disease; vii) asthma; viii) arthritis or rheumatism; 
ix) osteoporosis; x) cancer or malignant tumour (except if diagnosed more than 5 years ago); xi) 
stomach, duodenal or peptic ulcer; xii) Parkinson’s disease; xiii) cataracts; xiv) hip or femoral fracture; 
xv) any other diagnosed condition. 
† Respondents are presented orally with 10 common words and asked to remember them. Word recall is tested 
immediately and after a short delay during which other cognitive tests are performed. 
‡ Respondents are asked to solve up to three problems requiring simple mental calculations based on real-life situations. 
Those who fail the first question are asked an easier one (and given a total score of 1 if they get the second one wrong too 
or 2 if they get it right). Those who answer the first question correctly are asked two progressively more difficult questions 
(and given a total score of 3 if they get the first wrong, of 4 if they get only the first right and of 5 if they get both right).  
§ Excluding cancer that doesn’t cause pain (skin, testicle and thyroid) and also cases diagnosed more than four years 
previous. 
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Table 5: Education effects on propensity for any General Practitioner visit – Logit coefficient 
estimates from first part of hurdle model. Pooled cross-country sample (N=4098). 
  Models differentiated by means of controlling for need in six health domains 
  
Reported health 
category 
Latent health index from 
ordered probit 
Latent health index from 
HOPIT 
 Education Coeff. SE† 
Joint 
signif.‡   Coeff. SE 
Joint 
signif.   Coeff. SE 
Joint 
signif.   
Restricted model with homogeneous education effects (1)      
 
Lower 
secondary 
0.004 0.132 0.049 0.027 0.139 0.103 0.091 0.135 0.319 
 
Upper 
secondary 
0.015 0.121  0.100 0.143  0.201 0.140  
 Tertiary -0.287** 0.129  -0.186 0.128  -0.044 0.132  
Unrestricted model with country specific education effects (2)      
Belgium Lower second. -0.718* 0.436 0.401 -0.754 0.525 0.783 -0.627 0.550 0.647 
 Upper second. -0.337 0.454  -0.404 0.484  -0.234 0.495  
 Tertiary -0.508 0.450  -0.437 0.498  -0.221 0.530  
France Lower second. -0.480 0.448 0.076 -0.289 0.455 0.076 -0.114 0.447 0.620 
 Upper second. -0.214 0.315  -0.137 0.350  0.060 0.365  
 Tertiary -0.774** 0.308  -0.663* 0.350  -0.466 0.407  
Italy Upper second. -0.120 0.340 0.599 -0.087 0.374 0.237 0.033 0.394 0.488 
 Tertiary 0.261 0.332  0.494 0.438  0.583 0.510  
Germany Upper second. 0.085 0.431 0.201 0.174 0.500 0.842 0.313 0.506 0.622 
 Tertiary -0.485 0.464  -0.315 0.539  -0.109 0.578  
Greece Lower second. 0.617* 0.339 0.017 0.503 0.427 0.002 0.722 0.623 0.464 
 Upper second. -0.413* 0.213  -0.317 0.233  -0.263 0.244  
 Tertiary -0.215 0.250  -0.063 0.299  0.012 0.346  
NL Lower second. 0.435 0.348 0.245 0.436 0.396 0.940 0.700 0.432 0.049 
 Upper second. 0.726* 0.389  0.838** 0.401  1.293** 0.477  
 Tertiary 0.221 0.376  0.265 0.335  1.018** 0.482  
Spain Upper second. 0.536 0.413 0.018 0.624 0.483 0.735 0.581 0.489 0.094 
 Tertiary -0.691** 0.336  -0.631 0.400  -0.567 0.407  
Sweden Lower second. 0.020 0.334 0.257 -0.025 0.407 0.218 0.077 0.412 0.871 
 Upper second. 0.579* 0.318  0.410 0.408  0.298 0.418  
 Tertiary 0.314 0.307  0.149 0.313  0.240 0.330  
Likelihood ration tests of restricted (1) against unrestricted (2) model     
  LR df p-value LR df p-value LR df p-value 
  36.91 20 0.0120 33.85 20 0.0272 36.33 20 0.0140 
Notes: All models include controls for health in six domains, diagnosed chronic conditions, age, gender and country. The 
reference education category is primary school or less except for Italy, Germany and Spain. The first panel contains 
estimated education coefficients from a restricted model with no education-country interactions. The second panel contains 
country-specific education effects from a model with interactions. The ordered probit and HOPIT models used to predict the 
health indices include the same age, gender, education, country and education-country interactions, plus the health 
indicators listed in Table 4.  
† – Bootstrap standard error. ‡ – p-value from test of joint significance of education categories.  
*, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5%, 1%. 
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Table 6: Education effects on positive number of General Practitioner visits – Truncated Negative 
Binomial 2 coefficient estimates from second part of hurdle model. Pooled cross-country sample 
(N=3252). 
  Models differentiated by means of controlling for need in six health domains 
  
Reported health 
category 
Latent health index from 
ordered probit 
Latent health index from 
HOPIT 
 Education Coeff. SE 
Joint 
signif.   Coeff. SE 
Joint 
signif.   Coeff. SE 
Joint 
signif.   
Restricted model with homogeneous education effects (1)      
 
Lower 
secondary 
0.058 0.055 0.154 0.102 0.065 0.133 0.149** 0.067 0.019 
 
Upper 
secondary 
0.044 0.051  0.119
** 0.057  0.206
*** 0.067  
 Tertiary -0.068 0.059  0.029 0.070  0.141
* 0.081  
Unrestricted model with country specific education effects (2)      
Belgium Lower second. 0.144 0.130 0.569 0.144 0.153 0.783 0.213 0.164 0.316 
 Upper second. 0.162 0.129  0.164 0.179  0.329
* 0.190  
 Tertiary 0.064 0.131  0.085 0.158  0.228 0.178  
France Lower second. -0.187 0.150 0.011 -0.091 0.166 0.076 0.090 0.200 0.300 
 Upper second. -0.038 0.089  0.019 0.118  0.179 0.124  
 Tertiary -0.353
*** 0.111  -0.274** 0.112  -0.080 0.146  
Italy Upper second. 0.065 0.137 0.097 0.251 0.185 0.237 0.281 0.200 0.222 
 Tertiary -0.253
* 0.133  -0.059 0.195  -0.057 0.210  
Germany Upper second. -0.107 0.131 0.538 -0.051 0.159 0.842 0.036 0.162 0.877 
 Tertiary -0.179 0.163  -0.101 0.173  -0.047 0.205  
Greece Lower second. 0.301
* 0.163 0.019 0.205 0.164 0.002 0.246 0.160 0.003 
 Upper second. 0.304
** 0.126  0.409*** 0.138  0.420*** 0.143  
 Tertiary 0.367
** 0.151  0.499*** 0.156  0.562*** 0.174  
NL Lower second. 0.033 0.185 0.981 -0.006 0.171 0.940 0.104 0.193 0.412 
 Upper second. 0.061 0.203  0.095 0.192  0.261 0.226  
 Tertiary -0.009 0.210  0.028 0.184  0.373 0.238  
Spain Upper second. -0.074 0.129 0.783 -0.076 0.141 0.735 -0.077 0.140 0.750 
 Tertiary -0.079 0.155  0.073 0.221  0.070 0.231  
Sweden Lower second. 0.471
** 0.226 0.205 0.653* 0.343 0.218 0.645* 0.355 0.337 
 Upper second. 0.239 0.197  0.287
* 0.165  0.155 0.183  
 Tertiary 0.224 0.216  0.278 0.220  0.149 0.232  
Likelihood ration tests of restricted (1) against unrestricted (2) model     
  LR df p-value LR df p-value LR df p-value 
  31.67 20 0.0470 35.24 20 0.0189 35.11 20 0.0195 
Notes: As Table 5 
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Table 7: Education effects on propensity for any Specialist visit – Logit coefficient estimates from 
first part of hurdle model. Pooled cross-country sample (N=4098). 
  Models differentiated by means of controlling for need in six health domains 
  
Reported health 
category 
Latent health index from 
ordered probit 
Latent health index from 
HOPIT 
 Education Coeff. SE 
Joint 
signif.   Coeff. SE 
Joint 
signif.   Coeff. SE 
Joint 
signif.   
Restricted model with homogeneous education effects (1)      
 
Lower 
secondary 
0.387*** 0.107 0.000 0.368*** 0.115 0.000 0.414*** 0.118 0.000 
 
Upper 
secondary 
0.521*** 0.099  0.497*** 0.103  0.554*** 0.106  
 Tertiary 0.779*** 0.109  0.782*** 0.131  0.910*** 0.145  
Unrestricted model with country specific education effects (2)      
Belgium Lower second. 0.327 0.268 0.103 0.315 0.287 0.081 0.405 0.293 0.033 
 Upper second. 0.477* 0.268  0.481 0.318  0.579* 0.328  
 Tertiary 0.656** 0.274  0.708** 0.290  0.829*** 0.295  
France Lower second. 0.421 0.296 0.010 0.429 0.295 0.037 0.513* 0.306 0.033 
 Upper second. 0.198 0.186  0.172 0.218  0.261 0.231  
 Tertiary 0.697*** 0.212  0.690*** 0.239  0.755*** 0.257  
Italy Upper second. 0.564** 0.288 0.000 0.556** 0.270 0.001 0.609** 0.284 0.002 
 Tertiary 1.072*** 0.269  1.147*** 0.302  1.192*** 0.347  
Germany Upper second. 0.359 0.270 0.060 0.334 0.272 0.044 0.387 0.275 0.049 
 Tertiary 0.758** 0.322  0.784** 0.314  0.872** 0.358  
Greece Lower second. -0.318 0.349 0.000 -0.383 0.305 0.000 -0.207 0.335 0.000 
 Upper second. 0.881*** 0.209  0.866*** 0.195  0.888*** 0.205  
 Tertiary 1.050*** 0.245  1.127*** 0.235  1.125*** 0.261  
NL Lower second. 0.011 0.310 0.993 0.030 0.359 0.994 0.139 0.391 0.848 
 Upper second. -0.065 0.343  -0.043 0.373  0.164 0.392  
 Tertiary -0.016 0.343  0.008 0.382  0.417 0.520  
Spain Upper second. 0.723*** 0.274 0.017 0.753*** 0.237 0.006 0.706*** 0.247 0.016 
 Tertiary 0.518* 0.297  0.529 0.391  0.498 0.429  
Sweden Lower second. 0.469 0.354 0.057 0.409 0.404 0.063 0.455 0.418 0.033 
 Upper second. 0.509 0.321  0.440 0.318  0.361 0.333  
 Tertiary 0.856
*** 0.316  0.811*** 0.301  0.938*** 0.319  
Likelihood ration tests of restricted (1) against unrestricted (2) model     
  LR df p-value LR df p-value LR df p-value 
  27.97 20 0.1102 30.84 20 0.0573 21.88 20 0.3468 
Notes: As Table 5. 
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Table 8: Education effects on positive number of Specialist visits – Truncated Negative Binomial 
coefficient estimates from second part of hurdle model. Pooled cross-country sample (N=1833). 
  Models differentiated by means of controlling for need in six health domains 
  
Reported health 
category 
Latent health index from 
ordered probit 
Latent health index from 
HOPIT 
 Education Coeff. SE 
Joint 
signif.   Coeff. SE 
Joint 
signif.   Coeff. SE 
Joint 
signif.   
Restricted model with homogeneous education effects (1)      
 
Lower 
secondary 
0.177* 0.107 0.121 0.149 0.128 0.484 0.180 0.127 0.541 
 
Upper 
secondary 
-0.067 0.097  -0.026 0.110  0.050 0.114  
 Tertiary -0.024 0.105  -0.010 0.119  0.103 0.135  
Unrestricted model with country specific education effects (2)      
Belgium Lower second. 0.312 0.250 0.428 0.361 0.280 0.531 0.551* 0.284 0.270 
 Upper second. -0.044 0.248  0.121 0.267  0.305 0.239  
 Tertiary 0.074 0.247  0.126 0.252  0.378 0.264  
France Lower second. 0.295 0.285 0.273 0.380 0.421 0.266 0.554 0.430 0.114 
 Upper second. 0.138 0.184  0.160 0.221  0.379* 0.216  
 Tertiary -0.208 0.201  -0.194 0.208  0.030 0.244  
Italy Upper second. 0.286 0.296 0.624 0.383 0.238 0.269 0.482* 0.264 0.169 
 Tertiary 0.056 0.264  0.312 0.378  0.356 0.401  
Germany Upper second. -0.212 0.235 0.500 -0.275 0.236 0.504 -0.152 0.243 0.719 
 Tertiary -0.017 0.270  -0.123 0.293  0.063 0.318  
Greece Lower second. -0.163 0.400 0.354 -0.460 0.374 0.103 -0.295 0.439 0.179 
 Upper second. -0.028 0.206  -0.178 0.256  -0.202 0.269  
 Tertiary 0.348 0.237  0.287 0.249  0.261 0.249  
NL Lower second. 0.410 0.312 0.105 0.479 0.371 0.451 0.782** 0.400 0.234 
 Upper second. -0.159 0.358  0.163 0.411  0.596 0.454  
 Tertiary -0.068 0.351  0.076 0.375  0.878* 0.532  
Spain Upper second. -0.256 0.251 0.174 -0.546 0.402 0.339 -0.605 0.392 0.296 
 Tertiary -0.523* 0.295  -0.732 0.540  -0.654 0.567  
Sweden Lower second. -0.310 0.417 0.439 -0.252 0.438 0.801 -0.215 0.427 0.889 
 Upper second. 0.041 0.354  0.119 0.324  -0.002 0.334  
 Tertiary -0.501 0.366  -0.232 0.314  -0.246 0.334  
Likelihood ration tests of restricted (1) against unrestricted (2) model     
  LR df p-value LR df p-value LR df p-value 
  20.46 20 0.4295 27.05 20 0.1339 32.05 20 0.0428 
Notes: As Table 5. 
